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Deep Packet Inspection is a set of methodologies used for the analysis of data 
flow over the Internet. It is the intention of this Paper to describe technical 
details of this issue and to show that by using Deep Packet Inspection 
technologies it is possible to understand the content of Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol communications. These communications can carry 
publicly available content, private users’ information, legitimate copyrighted 
works, and even infringing copyrighted works. 
Legislation in many jurisdictions regarding Internet service providers’ 
liability, or more generally the liability of communication intermediaries, 
usually contains “safe harbor” provisions. The World Intellectual Property 
Organization Copyright Treaty of 1996 has a short but significant provision 
excluding liability for suppliers of physical facilities. The provision is aimed at 
communication to the public and the facilitation of physical means. Its frequent 
application to cases of contributory or vicarious liability, in absence of 
specific national implementation, can prove problematic. Two of the most 
relevant legislative interventions in the field, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act and the European Directive on Electronic Commerce, regulate extensively 
the field of intermediary liability. This paper looks at the relationship between 
existing packet inspection technologies, especially the “deep version,” and the 
international and national legal and regulatory interventions connected with 
intellectual property protection, and with the correlated liabilities exemptions. 
In analyzing these two main statutes, we will take a comparative look at 
similar interventions in Australia and Canada that can offer some interesting 
elements of reflection.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The default requirement for Internet communications is that the data is sent 
to its destination as fast as possible. The Internet is based on Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which is used to achieve 
communications by chunking the data into “packets” that are sent over the 
network toward their destination. Individual packets making up the same 
communication may take different routes to get to their destination in the 
fastest, most efficient, and non-congested way. Packets of different kinds and 
sources travel together around the network. The priority for delivery is 
generally first-in-first-out, a design that implies that there is no packet 
discrimination based on the source, destination, content, type, carrier, etc. Every 
packet is treated equally. For example, every packet suffers the same latency, 
regardless of whether or not the packet is of a kind that is time-sensitive (e.g., 
audio–video packets are treated like e-mail packets, even though the effect of a 
delay in delivery is very different). It has been argued that the Internet has been 
so successful as a communication system largely due to this end-to-end design.2 
From the Internet’s conception, no prioritization of packets over its 
infrastructure was envisaged.3 Some have argued that discrimination as to the 
handling of packets would increase network efficiency, and it is true that over a 
congested network it would be more efficient to prioritize those packets that are 
time sensitive.4 For example, delay of voice-over Internet protocol packets may 
render the communication useless, but the same delay in the case of an e-mail 
would pass unnoticed. Network Neutrality advocates usually do not consider 
this technology-based efficiency as a threat.5 
                                                                                                                       
 2 See J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984); see also Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence 
Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband 
Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930 (2001) (giving an overview of the architecture of end-to-
end design, and its contribution to the growth of the Internet). 
 3 For an early history of packet switching see, Lawrence G. Roberts, The Evolution of 
Packet Switching, 66 PROC. IEEE 1307, 1307 (1978); see also Lemley & Lessig, supra note 
2, at 931, 944 (highlighting the nondiscriminatory nature of the end-to-end design and its 
early use in telephone cable lines). 
 4 Jeane S.-C. Chen & Roch Guérin, Performance Study of an Input Queueing Packet 
Switch with Two Priority Classes, 39 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 117, 124 (1991). 
 5 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 142 (2003); Thomas Margoni & Mark Perry, Legal 
Consequences of Packet Inspection, in PROCEEDINGS OF CYBERLAWS: THE SECOND 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TECHNICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE E-SOCIETY 18, 19 
(2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028981. 
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II. THE TECHNOLOGY 
To get a better understanding of the issues involved with Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI), an overview of the protocols that are used to send information 
around the Internet and the nature and abilities of DPI is required.  
A. Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
The Internet is made up of various layers of technology and protocols. For 
example, the physical structure requires that there is some channel for 
communication between devices, ranging from radio waves to fiber cables and 
boxes, known as routers, which direct the Internet traffic. Small and sub-$100 
routers are becoming common in the networked home, but the cost can be very 
high for a core network router handling multi-Terabit per second throughput, 
such as those used by large Internet service providers (ISPs).  
In In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation,6 a clear and simple description 
of the creation of the packets is given by the court: 
Packet switching works as follows. The computer wishing to send a document 
(“originating computer”), such as a music file or digital image, cuts the 
document up into many small “packets” of information. Each packet contains 
the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address of the destination Web site, a small portion 
of data from the original document, and an indication of the data’s place in the 
original document. The originating computer then sends all of the packets 
through its local network to an external “router.” A router is a device that 
contains continuously-updated directories of Internet addresses called “routing 
tables.” The router takes each packet from the original document and sends it 
to the next available router in the direction of the destination Web site. Because 
each router is connected to many other routers and because the connection 
between any two given routers may be congested with traffic at a given 
moment, packets from the same document are often sent to different routers. 
Each of these routers, in turn, repeats this process, forwarding each packet it 
receives to the next available router in the direction of the destination Web site. 
Collectively, this process is called “dynamic routing.”7 
Each device that uses the Internet requires an address. Internet Protocol 
version 4 (IPv4), which is still widely used, allowed for a little over four billion 
IP addresses.8 These addresses are allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA), which is responsible for the global coordination of the 
Internet addressing system.9 Although concern was expressed in the 1980s as to 
                                                                                                                       
 6 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 7 Id. at 501. 
 8 As IPv4 is a thirty-two bit address space, it has an absolute maximum address space 
of 232 (i.e., two times two, thirty-two times, to equal 4,294,967,296). 
 9 IANA IPv4 Address Space Registry, IANA, http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-
address-space/ipv4-address-space.xhtml (last updated May 20, 2013) (“Originally, all the 
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the limiting factor of the number of addresses, and working parties were set up 
to explore alternatives, it has only been over the last few years that the adoption 
of IP version 6 (IPv6)10 has started to become more broadly adopted.11 IPv6 
allows for the addressing of 3.4×1038 (that is, 34 followed by 37 zeros) 
addresses.12 IPv4 and IPv6 will coexist for some years to come. Regardless of 
which protocol is used, a text file or video sent over the Internet is broken into 
small chunks known as packets. These packets are reassembled at the 
destination to make up the original file that was sent. Each packet that goes 
across the Internet can be regarded as an “envelope” around the chunk of data 
that is being transmitted. This envelope consists of the required information to 
make sure that packets are not lost: the routing information is put into what is 
known as the “header” of the packet. When a router receives a packet it just has 
to look at the header of the packet to know where it is supposed to go, and the 
router forwards the packet to that destination. It is fundamental to TCP/IP that 
packets are managed in this way, and that they are reassembled when they have 
reached their destination. The information that is necessary for reassembly in 
the correct order is also contained in the packet header. Packets are received in 
random order, and may not follow the same physical route.13 The structure of 
the headers for each packet is complex, and there is a lot more information 
contained in the header than simply the addressing of the packet; it will also 
include a lot more than just the sender and recipient addresses.14  
It is clear that by looking at the header of a packet, a great deal of 
information can be gleaned as to the communications between the sender and 
the recipient, but the content of the packet, the information that makes up the 
                                                                                                                       
IPv4 address spaces [were] managed directly by the IANA. Later parts of the address space 
were allocated to various other registries to manage for particular purposes or regional areas 
of the world.”). 
 10 IANA announced the worldwide deployment of IPv6 fourteen years ago. See 
Delegation of IPv6 Address Space, IANA (July 14, 1999, 12:32 PM), http://www.iana.org/ 
reports/1999/ ipv6-announcement.html.  
 11 Cisco provides a global visualisation of IPv6 use on its website. See IPv6 
Deployment, CISCO, http://6lab.cisco.com/stats/index.php (last visited July 10, 2013). In 
addition to greater address space in IPv6, there are many other differences from IPv4, 
including more efficient address header management.  
 12 This is a very large number. In the United States, it would be 400 undecillions.  
 13 INFO. SCIS. INST., UNIV. OF S. CAL., DOD STANDARD INTERNET PROTOCOL 7–9 
(1980), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc760.txt.pdf. 
 14 IPv6 includes at least the version, traffic class, flow label, length of the IPv6 payload, 
next header, and hop limit, which is a simplification of IPv4. See S. DEERING & R. HINDEN, 
NETWORK WORKING GRP., INTERNET PROTOCOL, VERSION 6 (IPV6): SPECIFICATION 4–5 
(Dec. 1998), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2460.  
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communication, is not revealed.15 Routers have no need to examine such 
information. Routers need to determine what to do with a packet as fast as 
possible and to send it on its way. 
B. Deep Packet Inspection 
DPI includes a set of methodologies used for the analysis of data flow over 
the Internet. Clearly, for the Internet to function, the header information of 
packets must be read by routers. In contrast to this “shallow” packet inspection 
for functional purposes, DPI goes into the data content of the packet.16  It is not 
the intention here to describe the full technical details of this issue, but rather 
show enough to demonstrate that by using DPI technologies, it is possible to 
understand more than the addressing details of TCP/IP communications.  
The technologies used in DPI are, as with other information technologies, 
ever in development and advancement. In 2008, Deutsche Telekom made a 
submission to the European Commission’s Consultation on “Creative Content 
Online in the Single Market” in which it stated: 
[With DPI, e]very IP frame must be decoded; many IP frames of a connection 
must be cached, consolidated and inspected to consider which type of protocol 
is used in an IP connection. The used protocol in the IP connection must be 
decoded, cached, consolidated and inspected as well, to find out, which type of 
data is transmitted in the connection. Since protocol tunnels are a common use, 
                                                                                                                       
 15 Look at a packet header: 
 
 0                   1                   2                   3  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         | 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|  Time to Live |    Protocol   |         Header Checksum       |   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|                       Source Address                          |   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|                    Destination Address                        |   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|                    Options                    |    Padding    |   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      
 
INFO. SCIS. INST., UNIV. OF S. CAL., INTERNET PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM 
PROTOCOL 11 (1981), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc791.txt.pdf.  
 16 See generally Talitha Nabbali & Mark Perry, Going for the Throat: Carnivore in an 
Echelon World—Part I, 19 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 456 (2003); Talitha Nabbali & 
Mark Perry, Going for the Throat: Carnivore in an ECHELON World—Part II, 20 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 84 (2004) (both articles discussing these header tracing 
technologies and their use in government surveillance). 
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it is possible, that the type of data is just another protocol, which must be 
decoded, cached, consolidated and inspected and so on. 
Once the used protocol is identified, a [sic] software is needed, which 
understands the protocol to interpret the transmitted data. If the connection 
itself or the transmitted data is encrypted with strong encryption methods, it is 
not possible to decrypt the transmitted data and to find out, which data or type 
of data is transmitted. Just using HTTPS [Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure] 
(mostly known from home banking or web mail) makes it impossible for Deep 
Packet Inspection, to find out, which URL [uniform resource locator] is used 
(just the FQDN [fully qualified domain name] is known), which type of data is 
transmitted or which content was requested.17 
The point Deutsche Telekom was making was that using DPI for the 
purpose of “such a general monitoring of the whole traffic of all of our 
customers regardless of whether a suspicion exists or not cannot realistically be 
an option for right holders to fight piracy.”18 However, the ability of the 
software available today allows for more information to be extracted, processed, 
and made available with less data. One DPI provider, for example, states that it 
developed DPX Network Probe for “lawful interception and network analysis in 
real-time,”19 in cooperation with state authorities and law enforcement agencies. 
However, an amazing assertion was made just a year later from the same DPI 
vendor:  
It is a common claim that encryption and obfuscation prevent DPI systems 
from being able to classify the encrypted network flow. While it is true that 
plain pattern matching does not work with encrypted communication, modern 
DPI systems go beyond this simple method. They use behavioral and statistical 
analysis as described above. In fact, encryption has very little effect on the 
classification ability and accuracy of advanced DPI equipment.20  
                                                                                                                       
 17 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, CONSULTATION ON “CREATIVE CONTENT ONLINE IN THE 
SINGLE MARKET” 15 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/ 
col_2008/comp/dtelecom_en.pdf. 
 18 Id. 
 19 DPX Network Probe, IPOQUE, http://www.ipoque.com/en/products/dpx-network-
probe (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).  
 20 KLAUS MOCHALSKI & HENDRIK SCHULZE, IPOQUE, DEEP PACKET INSPECTION: 
TECHNOLOGY, APPLICATIONS & NET NEUTRALITY 4–5 (2009), available at http://www.ipo 
que.com/sites/default/files/mediafiles/documents/white-paper-deep-packet-inspection.pdf 
(emphasis added). This quote must be seen in context; it is about P2P traffic:  
The common claim among P2P users and DPI opponents that the use of encryption and 
obfuscation in P2P networks like eDonkey and BitTorrent is a measure to ensure the 
users’ privacy is plain dishonest. Even if encryption is enabled, files are still shared 
with the general public, so for everybody to download, store and read – of course in 
unencrypted format. This is also why encryption does not provide any protection 
against copyright investigations in P2P networks, where investigators use normal P2P 
clients to participate in the network and download files from potential infringers. The 
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The authors go on to reassure us that DPI does not enable “reading” of 
encrypted content and “DPI as such has no negative impact on online 
privacy.”21  
The vendors of DPI give much information on their abilities to read 
packets, and even if the packet data content is encrypted, it seems possible to 
“understand” the type of data involved in the communication. Indeed, using 
such techniques as DPI, it is possible to gain useful intelligence about the 
“network” that is being studied.22 The privacy implications for Internet users by 
the adoption of DPI has been widely canvassed,23 but here we are more 
interested in the relationship between the use of such technologies and the safe 
harbor sheltering offered by legislation for ISPs, discussed below. The issue of 
finding a deep pocket is one that should be on the mind of all litigators if the 
aim is to achieve compensation for damages. 
III. DEEP POCKETS AND SAFE HARBORS 
Litigation against those with deep pockets usually makes most sense when 
suing for copyright infringement and seeking to recover damages. In the United 
States, actions against infringers have led to very high judgments against 
individuals by relying on actual or statutory damages.24 This is due to the desire 
                                                                                                                       
only sensible reason for encryption is the attempt to circumvent bandwidth limitations 
imposed for P2P transfers by the ISP. However, with modern traffic management 
systems, which are able to reliably detect obfuscated and encrypted P2P traffic, this 
measure is totally ineffective. 
Id. at 5.  
 21 Id. at 7. 
 22 GRAHAM FINNIE, QOSMOS & HEAVY READING, THE ROLE OF DPI IN AN SDN 
WORLD 13 (2012), available at http://www.qosmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ 
Heavy_Reading-Qosmos_DPI-SDN-WP_Dec-2012.pdf. Heavy Reading reports that in 
2011, investment in DPI exceeded half a billion dollars. Id. at 9.  
 23 E.g., Christopher Witteman, Information Freedom, a Constitutional Value for the 
21st Century, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 187 n.141 (2013) (although 
Witteman makes little of the issue); The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech. & 
the Internet, 111th Cong. 1–2 (Apr. 23, 2009) (statement of Leslie Harris, Pres. and CEO, 
Center for Democracy & Technology), available at https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/200904 
23_dpi_testimony.pdf. 
 24 Actual damages allow the plaintiff to recover the copyright owner’s actual damages 
and any additional profits of the infringer. Statutory damages are in the range of $750 to 
$30,000 at the discretion of the court. Statutory damages can be lowered to $200 in the case 
of innocent infringement or raised to $150,000 in case of willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c)(1)–(2) (2012). Punitive damages have traditionally been excluded for cases of 
copyright infringement, since the punitive purpose is generally achieved through the 
reported increase in case of willful infringement. See, e.g., On Davis v. GAP, Inc., 246 F.3d 
152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001); Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983).  
1202 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74:6 
 
to make examples of infringers and to punish them.25 However, even in the 
United States, these actions have not won general approval from the public at 
large.26 An alternative target would be to sue the ISP, whether the gateway host 
or content host. Intermediaries such as service, hosting, and content providers 
are usually public companies or large corporations, which means that they are 
much more solvent. Further, being that their activities and information are 
public, they can be easily identified, and suing a few big and solvent companies 
is easier than going after a myriad of individual users. However, one of the 
issues that a potential litigant needs to face is the shelter that is provided for 
ISPs in many jurisdictions, known as safe harbor legislation.  
The World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty (WCT) may 
be seen as the root for consensus on providing exclusion of liability to providers 
of physical facilities for Internet communications, i.e., for ISPs. This comes 
from the Agreed Statements on Article 8 of the WCT providing:  
It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or 
making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within 
the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood 
that nothing in Article 8 precludes a Contracting Party from applying Article 
11bis(2).27 
Article 8 of the WCT creates a general right of communication to the 
public—a novel approach at the time in copyright at the international level28—
and the scope of the Agreed Statements is to clarify that the mere provision of 
physical facilities for enabling a communication is not tantamount to an act of 
communication itself, which otherwise would be infringing the newly created 
right. Although not a detailed basis for regulation of the field, the Agreed 
Statements on Article 8 can certainly be seen as an important principle placed in 
one of the major international instruments in the field of copyright law. This 
was particularly important during a time when the role played by intermediaries 
                                                                                                                       
 25 See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 489–90 (1st Cir. 
2011) (Sony received $675,000 in damages after a judgment was entered against defendant 
Tenenbaum for copyright infringements of thirty songs when he was a twenty-year-old 
student.). 
 26 Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation 
Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 589 (2005); see also Justin Hughes, On 
the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business 
Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 729–30 (2005). 
 27 Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG. (Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Agreed Statements WIPO], http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/ip/wct/statements.html. 
 28 Prior to this, the right to communication to the public was contained in different 
provisions dealing with specific subject matter or type of authors. See Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works arts. 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i)–(ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 
14(1)(ii), 14bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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in online communication was far from clear in the limited but growing case law 
available.29  
Article 8 and the connected Agreed Statements express the rule that the 
mere provision of physical facilities that enable a communication to the public 
does not constitute an act of communication to the public by itself, and 
therefore excludes liability for direct copyright infringement. However, under 
the general law of torts (differences among legal systems, especially between 
common law and civil law traditions, will not be addressed in this Paper), 
liability can be found not only for acts of direct infringement, but also where a 
subject facilitates or has a causational role in the line of events conducive to the 
tortious event.30 
By virtue of the Agreed Statements of Article 8, ISPs can be considered 
exempted from direct liability when their actions are limited to the provision of 
the physical means necessary for an online communication.31 However, they 
can still be found liable for acts of indirect infringement, at least as long as the 
right of communication to the public of copyrighted material is involved, and as 
long as we assume that ISPs provide physical facilities and not software ones.32 
Interestingly, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, signed simultaneously with the WCT, 
lacks any such limitation of liability.33 
                                                                                                                       
 29 During the 1990s, courts had occasion to decide on the issue of online 
intermediaries’ liability, especially in the United States, but followed different uncoordinated 
approaches. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–59 (M.D. Fla. 
1993) (finding a Bulletin Board Service liable for copyright infringement even though it did 
not upload the work nor had knowledge of the infringing activity); see also Niva Elkin-
Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case 
Against Copyright Liability of the Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
345, 348–49, 353–55 (1995) (discussing several circuit court approaches to liability in this 
context); KAMIEL KOELMAN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INST. FOR INFO. LAW, UNIV. OF 
AMSTERDAM & WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORKSHOP ON SERVICE PROVIDER 
LIABILITY: ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 12 (1999), 
available at http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/wipo99.pdf (discussing a shift among 
courts from rigid imposition of copyright liability on online intermediaries to more relaxed 
approaches). For a case of exclusion of liability, see the landmark case Religious Tech. Ctr. 
v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also 
Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime To Enable Public 
Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 
983 (2007) (highlighting the competing interests to be addressed in safe harbor legislation, 
including copyright liability for ISPs). 
 30 As, for instance, clarified by the court in Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373. 
 31 See Agreed Statements WIPO, supra note 27 (The Statements clarify the meaning of 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as it relates to digital 
versions of such works.).  
 32 See id.  
 33 See generally WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Dec. 20, 1996, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/ 
en/wppt/trt_wppt_001en.pdf. 
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An exemption of liability limited to the provision of physical facilities 
becomes quite unrealistic today when we have vast social networks and 
widespread adoption of Web2.0, i.e., where the provision of services and 
software is the key technological and economic activity. However, in 1996, the 
provision in the WCT represented an acceptable compromise at the 
international level. 
The two main pieces of legislation that have regulated in a detailed manner 
the ambit of ISPs’ liability at the national level are the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA)34 and (indirectly) the Electronic Commerce Directive 
(ECD).35 The DMCA updated the Copyright Act of 1978 by introducing into 
U.S. law those provisions that create specific zones of (secondary) liability 
exemptions for qualifying ISPs when meeting certain conditions.36 
The ECD has done something quite similar for the European Union (EU).37 
Note that under EU law, a Directive represents a piece of “framework” 
legislation, directed to Member States of the EU, which have the obligation to 
implement it into their domestic legal systems within the provided time limits. 
During the process of implementation, Member States are usually left with 
(explicit or implicit) margins of operations, thereby rendering every national 
implementation potentially different but “harmonized.” When we analyze the 
liability exemptions set forth by the ECD, we are looking at a system that is the 
reference for the whole EU. That being said, specific implementation in each 
Member State is sometimes the key to understanding how liability exemptions 
work in EU countries, since national courts have proven to be quite attached to 
their traditional construction of tortious liability.38 
Another major difference between the DMCA and the ECD resides in the 
different ambits of application. In fact, the DMCA, as we have seen, amends the 
Copyright Act39 and applies to copyright infringements. If liability limitations 
exist outside the realm of copyright law in the United States, it is by virtue of 
specific acts that regulate specific ambits (for example, Section 230 of the 
                                                                                                                       
 34 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860. 
 35 Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Electronic 
Commerce Directive]. 
 36 See generally Digital Millenium Copyright Act (categories of service providers and 
various factors in determining exemption throughout the Act). 
 37 Although an EU Directive is not directly applicable to Member States, its scope is to 
establish a harmonized legal framework within which EU Member States enact specific 
national rules to comply with the Directive. 
 38 See, e.g., Tribunale di Milano [Tribunal of Milan], Reti Televisive Italiane S.p.A. 
(RTI) c. Italia On Line s.r.l. (IOL) 20 gennaio 2011, n. 7680/2011; Cour d’ appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Paris, Google Inc. v. Bac Films, Jan. 14, 2011 (partially 
confirmed, partially remanded by Cour de cassation Arrêt n° 828 du juillet 2012). 
 39 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; A. Michael Froomkin, 
“PETs Must Be on a Leash”: How U.S. Law (and Industry Practice) Often Undermines and 
Even Forbids Valuable Privacy Enhancing Technology, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 965 (2013). 
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Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996),40 or because the system set up 
by the DMCA has been used as a sort of reference model by U.S courts (as it 
has been observed sometimes in the case of trademark law).41 
The ECD, on the contrary, applies horizontally to any illegal information or 
activity happening on a service of the information society (the Internet for our 
purposes). Therefore, the system of indirect liability exemptions set forth by the 
ECD will be relevant for cases of alleged copyright infringement, as well as for 
cases of defamation, or limitations of the right to freedom of expression, 
privacy violations, or any other act that can be considered illegal. 
Entering more into the specific details of the two statutes, we can observe a 
similar approach in the regulation of ISP liability. Both identify different types 
of intermediaries operating as service providers, and set forth conditions and 
obligations that need to be fulfilled in order for those intermediaries to be 
exempted, at least from monetary liabilities.42 Under specific circumstances, 
ISPs can be the target of injunctions from courts or even administrative bodies 
aimed at the removal of the identified illegal content or copyright infringing 
material.43 
Access providers offer Internet access to their subscribers, who use the 
cables, wires, routers, and connectivity in order to access the Internet, connect 
to websites, upload and download information, and any other online activity one 
can think of. It is clear that, from a causation point of view, this type of ISP 
represents an essential element of the existence of the “network,” and thus can 
be found indirectly liable in a case of copyright infringement, since without its 
intervention the tortfeasor (e.g., the user illegally uploading a song) would not 
have been able to perpetrate his or her infringing activities. To be exempted 
from contributory liability, this type of intermediary needs to operate as a mere 
conduit.44 It needs to refrain from activities such as initiating the transmission, 
selecting the content, selecting the recipient, modifying the content, or making 
copies of the content, in addition to those activities for intermediate or transient 
storage, which in any case cannot be made accessible to anybody other than the 
                                                                                                                       
 40 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 501, 110 Stat. 133 (The 
Telecommunications Decency Act is the popular name for Title V of the 
Telecommunications Act.). 
 41 Trademarks, for example, are not covered by Section 230 of the CDA, nor by the 
DMCA. Therefore a website hosting an infringing trademark uploaded by one of its users 
could be found liable upon reception of a notice to take it down. Even if such notice is not 
proper of the trademark world, there will be a strong incentive for the website to take such 
content down. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 101, 104–05 (2007). 
 42 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(c) (2012); Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, 
arts. 12–14. 
 43 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(c); Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, arts. 12(3), 
13(2), 14(3).  
 44 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a); Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 12. 
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intended recipient and cannot be accessed beyond the period of time necessary 
for the transmission.45 
A second type of intermediary identified by both statutes is that of a 
caching provider.46 This intermediary creates copies of the content made 
available by users to enhance the efficiency of the network (a common practice 
on the Internet that occurs without users noticing).47 In the case of caching, the 
intermediary is not liable with regard to those copies as long as it does not 
modify the information copied, it complies with rules regarding access, 
updating, and refreshing, it does not interfere with the lawful use of technology 
widely recognized and used by industry to obtain data on the use of the 
information, and it  
acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has 
stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the 
initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or 
access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has 
ordered such removal or disablement.48 
A third type of intermediary identified by both the EU and the United States 
regards hosting providers.49 A service provider that offers storage services at 
the direction of users is not subject to liability, as long as the provider is 
ignorant of the presence of such infringing content, does not receive direct 
financial benefit attributable to the infringing material (conditions present only 
in the DMCA), and acts expeditiously to remove such content upon acquiring 
such knowledge.50 The absence of the requirement of no financial benefit is not 
the only major difference between the DMCA and the ECD. In fact, the way in 
which such knowledge of content can be acquired is extensively regulated in the 
DMCA, while it is almost completely absent in the ECD. The latter only 
mentions a general possibility for Member States to implement procedures 
governing the removal of such information.51 
                                                                                                                       
 45 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a); Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 12(1). 
The specific wording of these two provisions is in fact quite similar. 
 46 17 U.S.C. § 512(b); Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 13. 
 47 Caching is a very common practice on the Internet. In order to reduce the distance 
that a transmission has to cover for every single connection, local copies in intermediate 
positions on the network are created so that connections can easily reach such closer copies 
instead of travelling all the way to the source. See Electronic Commerce Directive, supra 
note 35, art. 13(1) (describing the process of caching). 
 48 Id. art. 13(1)(e). See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E) for a rule with a similar effect, 
although the wording of this provision is much more detailed than that of the Directive. 
 49 Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 14; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 50 Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 14; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 51 Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, art. 14(3) (“This Article shall not 
affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member 
States’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an 
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This difference in approach is at the core of the current transatlantic debate 
regarding ISP liability. We have seen how similar the relevant provisions are in 
creating areas of secondary liability exemptions, also known as safe harbors. 
The three types of intermediaries analyzed are similarly defined, and the 
conditions that they have to meet to enjoy such exemptions are comparable. It is 
true that the DMCA (as well as the Canadian Copyright Modernisation Act of 
201252) identifies a fourth category of intermediaries that the ECD does not, 
i.e., Information Location Tools (search engines).53 For the purpose of the 
present analysis this is an aspect that can be put aside.54 The aspect that has 
driven much of the current debate, especially at the EU level, is the necessity 
for a system of notice and take-down, similar to that of the United States. 
Indeed, twelve years after the implementation of the ECD, the creation of 
procedures for the notification and removal of illegal information has not 
emerged with the promptness and coherency that the EU legislature probably 
had in mind when drafting the already mentioned Article 15(2) of the ECD, for 
example, as witnessed by Recital 40.55 Member States have failed to implement 
generalized procedures to remove content upon receipt of specific notifications, 
and courts have found themselves in the place that the EU legislature had 
originally reserved for national parliaments and governments: deciding the 
content and effects of those notices that right-holders have started to address 
also to non-U.S.-based providers.  
A brief summary regarding the DMCA requirements for a notice and take-
down procedure is at this point beneficial. As we have seen, absence of actual 
knowledge is a key factor to ISPs’ enjoying the safe harbor provision for 
                                                                                                                       
infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures 
governing the removal or disabling of access to information.”). 
 52 See An Act To Amend the Copyright Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.). 
 53 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d); Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, art. 41.27 (Can.). 
 54 In a case involving Google and its search engine activity, the European Court of 
Justice found that Google operated as a hosting provider. See Case C-236/08, Google France 
S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2467, I-2510–11. 
 55 See Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, at 6 (“Both existing and 
emerging disparities in Member States’ legislation and case-law concerning liability of 
service providers acting as intermediaries prevent the smooth functioning of the internal 
market, in particular by impairing the development of cross-border services and producing 
distortions of competition; service providers have a duty to act, under certain circumstances, 
with a view to preventing or stopping illegal activities; this Directive should constitute the 
appropriate basis for the development of rapid and reliable procedures for removing and 
disabling access to illegal information; such mechanisms could be developed on the basis of 
voluntary agreements between all parties concerned and should be encouraged by Member 
States; it is in the interest of all parties involved in the provision of information society 
services to adopt and implement such procedures; the provisions of this Directive relating to 
liability should not preclude the development and effective operation, by the different 
interested parties, of technical systems of protection and identification and of technical 
surveillance instruments made possible by digital technology within the limits laid down by 
Directives 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC.”). 
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copyright infringement caused by users of storage services.56 Such knowledge 
can be acquired upon receipt of a specific notice sent by right-holders.57 The 
service provider has to implement specific measures if it wants to qualify under 
the safe harbor provisions.58 First, it has to designate an agent to receive 
notifications of claimed infringement.59 It has to make the relevant information 
regarding the notification system for potential infringements available on its 
website in a location accessible to the public. The agent is the person who 
receives notices that must be written and signed, and that contain information 
on the work allegedly infringed, the infringing material, and the complaining 
party.60 The complaining party must have a good faith belief that the complaints 
and the information provided are accurate.61 A notice that does not contain all 
the information required by the Act cannot be considered appropriate to trigger 
the threshold knowledge required by providers for a finding of liable conduct.62 
Once the notice in proper form has been received by the agent, the content has 
to be taken down or access to it disabled.63 The provider will in no circumstance 
be held liable for the removal (including content that eventually proves to be 
non-infringing) as long as the notification sent follows the above-mentioned 
rules and as long as the provider takes reasonable steps to promptly notify the 
subscriber of the removal. The subscriber, in turn, can counter-notify the ISP 
through the same agent, claiming that he has a good faith belief that the 
removed material was not infringing.  
The counter-notice requirements are similar to those of the notice. Such 
counter-notification has to be forwarded to the original notification issuer with 
the warning that within ten business days the material will be restored, and 
restore it in ten to fourteen days, unless the agent receives a notification 
informing him or her that an action has been filed for a court order to stop the 
infringing activity.64 This represents a succinct summary of the main provisions 
contained in the DMCA regarding the take-down procedures following the 
receipt of a proper notice. The detail with which the legislature has framed the 
DMCA provision stands out when compared to the EU equivalent. 
If we turn our attention to the EU ECD and its “equivalent” provision, we 
immediately see how scarce are the directions given with regard to the removal 
of illegal content procedures. Such an approach is opposite to that employed by 
the DMCA, by an act that otherwise has followed closely its U.S. counterpart. 
Comparison with the Canadian and Australian legislation shows further 
differences. 
                                                                                                                       
 56 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
 57 See id.  
 58 Id. § 512(c)(1)–(2). 
 59 See id.  
 60 Id. § 512(c)(2)–(3). 
 61 See id. § 512(c)(3). 
 62 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).  
 63 Id. § 512(c)(1). 
 64 Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
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The Canadian approach with regard to the notification procedures is 
interesting in this specific regard. Notably, the sections regarding the notice and 
notice provision (41.25 and 41.26) are approved but not yet in force. On the one 
hand, it follows a structure similar to the DMCA in the details that notifications 
should possess, but with a major difference concerning the obligations of the 
receiver of such a notification. The intermediary that receives a proper notice 
does not have an obligation to remove or disable access to the allegedly 
infringing content.65 Its only obligation is to forward such notice to the user that 
has uploaded such content.66 As long as the intermediary operates as a 
communication forwarder between the copyright-holder and the user, it is 
exempted from liability.67 Such a system takes the name of “notice-and-
notice.”68 The legislative summary of Bill C-11 (An Act To Amend the 
Copyright Act), states that “concern has been raised that a ‘notice-and-
takedown’ regime could create incentives for ISPs to remove content without 
warning or evidence of actual infringement, which can potentially lead to a 
stifling of free expression” and “the Privacy Commissioner of Canada raised 
concerns about the privacy implications of requiring ISPs to retain personal 
information for the purposes of the regime.”69 
As previously pointed out, it is too early to say how this novel approach to 
balancing the interests of the stakeholders will pan out. 
Australia has broad safe harbor provisions, while employing yet another 
approach. Division 2AA of Part V of the Australian Copyright Act provides 
                                                                                                                       
 65 See An Act To Amend the Copyright Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, art. 41.27 (Can.). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-42, arts. 41.25, 41.26, 41.27(3) (Can.) (brought in 
by An Act To Amend the Copyright Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.)). These will come into 
effect only following a consultation process and Order-in-Council.  
41.26 (1) A person described in paragraph 41.25(1)(a) or (b) who receives a notice of 
claimed infringement that complies with subsection 41.25(2) shall, on being paid any 
fee that the person has lawfully charged for doing so, 
(a) as soon as feasible forward the notice electronically to the person to whom the 
electronic location identified by the location data specified in the notice belongs and 
inform the claimant of its forwarding or, if applicable, of the reason why it was not 
possible to forward it; and 
(b) retain records that will allow the identity of the person to whom the electronic 
location belongs to be determined, and do so for six months beginning on the day on 
which the notice of claimed infringement is received or, if the claimant commences 
proceedings relating to the claimed infringement and so notifies the person before the 
end of those six months, for one year after the day on which the person receives the 
notice of claimed infringement. 
 
Id. art. 41.26. 
 69 See Dara Lithwick & Maxime-Olivier Thibodeau, Parliament of Canada, Legislative 
Summary of Bill C-11 § 3.2.3 (rev. 2012), available at www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/ 
LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=c11&parl=41&Ses=1. 
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protection for “Carriage Service Providers” that limits the liability of ISPs in 
actions against them “for infringements of copyright that relate to the carrying 
out of certain online activities.”70 If an ISP is “providing facilities or services 
for transmitting, routing or providing connections for copyright material, or the 
intermediate and transient storage of copyright material”71 whilst executing 
those services, relief is limited to terminating a specific account or to taking 
“reasonable steps to disable access to an online location outside Australia.”72 
In Roadshow Films Pty Ltd. v iiNet Ltd.,73 the High Court of Australia 
found that the conduct of iiNet did not constitute “authorisation of its 
customers’ copyright infringement” even though they had knowledge of the 
infringements. There was no obligation for iiNet to take action against such 
infringers. 
EU ECD Article 14(3) reads, “This Article shall not affect the 
possibility . . . for Member States of establishing procedures governing the 
removal or disabling of access to information.”74 Such a provision leaves up to 
Member States the decision of whether and how to implement a system of 
notice and take-down.75  
So far, no country has set up a detailed system of notice and take-down at 
the legislative level. France stands out, since it actually created a system of 
notice and take-down in its Confidence in the Digital Economy Act.76 While 
such a procedure contained in Article 6.I.5 of the Act is only optional, it is one 
way to activate the knowledge requirement of the intermediary. Interestingly, 
however, courts have consistently interpreted such provision as being the 
liability-trigger requirement for ISPs, turning the legislative optional way into a 
de facto mandatory procedure.77 This is in spite of the French Constitutional 
Council provision, that there is no obligation to remove a notified illegal content 
unless it is manifestly illegal, expressed in a 2004 decision.78 Other countries 
have attempted to regulate the field of notification procedures, but without 
much success. This is due to institutional and general public acceptance issues, 
for example, in the case of Italy. The Italian Telecommunications Authority—
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (AGCOM)—has taken different 
                                                                                                                       
 70 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AA(1) (Austl.). 
 71 Id. s 116AC. 
 72 Id. s 116AG. 
 73 (2012) 286 ALR 466, 466 (Austl.). 
 74 Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, at 13. 
 75 See, e.g., id. at 6. 
 76 See Loi 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique 
[Law 2004-575 of June 21, 2004 on Confidence in the Digital Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL 
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 2004, at 
11168. 
 77 See generally Catherine Jasserand, Critical Views on the French Approach to “Net 
Neutrality,” J. INTERNET L. 18 (2013) (discussing the net neutrality debate in France spurred 
by the adoption and implementation of the revised European telecom rules).  
 78 See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2004-496DC, 
June 10, 2004, J.O. 11182 (Fr.).  
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steps towards the creation of a notice and take-down procedure, but has not 
been able to bring these steps to conclusion yet.79 Currently, a proposal of 
regulation has been issued and is open for public comment.80 The proposal sets 
forth a system of notice and take-down and creates an administrative body (a 
section of the AGCOM) that will have the power to order the removal of 
infringing content, or disablement of access in case of foreign websites, when 
the notified intermediary does not proceed to the removal by itself. The 
proposal seems to still be in an early stage, and many concepts (such as the 
difference between access, caching, and hosting providers) are not defined. The 
proposed regulation seems to need some refining before an objective analysis 
can be developed.   
The fact that EU Member States have failed or demonstrated scarce interest 
in the regulation of notification procedures for the removal of illegal content 
should not suggest that the issue of notice and take-down has disappeared from 
the EU agenda or from the courts’ case law. 
In January 2012, the European Commission (EC) announced an initiative 
on “notice-and-action” procedures in their Communication on e-Commerce and 
other online services.81 In such Communication, the EC calls for a “horizontal 
European framework for notice and action procedures”82 and for a system “to 
combat illegal content more effectively and in a manner which upholds the 
internal market and fundamental rights by improving the framework for civil 
law proceedings.”83 In the wording of the EC, “‘Notice-and-action’ procedures 
begin when someone notifies a hosting service provider . . . about illegal 
content on the internet. . . . [They] are concluded when a hosting service 
provider acts against the alleged illegal content.”84 As a result of a 2010 public 
consultation on e-Commerce,85 stakeholders indicated that these procedures 
“should lead to a quicker takedown of illegal content, should better respect 
                                                                                                                       
 79 See Press Release Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (AGCOM), Draft 
Regulations on On-Line Copyright Protection Approved (July 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?DocID=11592. 
 80 See Delibera N. 452/13/CONS, Consultazione pubblica sullo schema di regolamento 
in materia di tutela del diritto d’autore sulle reti di comunicazione elettronica e procedure 
attuative ai sensi del decreto legislativo, AUTORITÀ PER LE GARANZIE NELLE 
COMUNICAZIONI (AGCOM) (Apr. 9, 2003) (It.). 
 81 Commission Communication for a Coherent Framework for Building Trust in the 
Digital Single Market for E-Commerce and Online Services, at 15, COM (2011) 942 final 
(Nov. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Communication]. 
 82 Id. at 13. 
 83 Id. at 14. 
 84 See Notice-and-Action Procedures, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/notice-and-action/index_en.htm (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2013). 
 85 Public Consultation on the Future of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market 
and the Implementation of the Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC), EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/e-commerce_en.htm 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2013). 
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fundamental rights (in particular the freedom of expression) and should increase 
legal certainty for online intermediaries.”86 Furthermore, in June 2012, the EC 
launched a public consultation on procedures for dealing with illegal content on 
the Internet, titled: A Clean and Open Internet.87 The consultation involves the 
issue of notification of illegal content, exploring issues such as whether service 
providers should put in place mechanisms to notify illegal content that are easy 
to find and easy to use, and if so, whether illegal content should exclusively be 
notified by such mechanisms or whether other alternative routes should be 
followed. The consultation also concerns acting on illegal content and explores 
issues related to service providers’ roles in consulting the uploaders of alleged 
illegal content and whether they should provide feedback to notice providers.88 
In light of the aforementioned, the direction of the EC’s agenda in the field 
of ISP liability seems clear, i.e., a horizontal system of notification and action 
that includes the removal of illegal material, similar to the one adopted a decade 
ago by the U.S. legislature, but applied generally to all online illegal 
information and activities. Such an approach would certainly have the 
advantage over its North American counterpart to offer a unique scheme for 
safe harbor, instead of a system where copyright follows one route, patent and 
trademark a different one, and defamation, yet another one. 
After all, a system of notice-and-action (a term that includes, but is not 
limited to, a take-down) is already partially implemented in the EU, as 
witnessed by industry and commercial practice and recognized to some extent 
also by courts.89 In particular, the European Court of Justice has delivered a few 
decisions that have clarified interpretations connected with the removal of 
illegal information from the Internet.  
In the landmark case L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG, the European 
Court of Justice clarified that a notice for the removal of allegedly infringing 
content “cannot automatically preclude the exemption from liability provided 
for in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, given that notifications of allegedly 
illegal activities or information may turn out to be insufficiently precise or 
inadequately substantiated.”90 Therefore, under current EU law, a notification 
does not represent a tool that automatically triggers the requirement of actual 
knowledge on the recipient and thus exempts the recipient from the safe harbor. 
                                                                                                                       
 86 Notice-and-Action Procedures, supra note 84. 
 87 A Clean and Open Internet: Public Consultation on Procedures for Notifying and 
Acting on Illegal Content Hosted by Online Intermediaries, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/clean-and-open-internet_en.htm (last 
updated Apr. 9, 2012). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Memorandum of Understanding, European Commission (May 4, 2011), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/memorandum_040520 
11_en.pdf, for an example of industry position, signed in Brussels by representatives of the 
sector. 
 90 Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011 ¶ 122. 
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The court added that in specific cases, such notification can indeed achieve the 
goal of triggering liability, 
[for] such notification represents, as a general rule, a factor of which the 
national court must take account when determining, in the light of the 
information so transmitted to the operator, whether the latter was actually 
aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic 
operator should have identified the illegality.91 
If the EU decides to go in the direction chosen more than a decade ago by 
the DMCA, it might want to keep in mind what a decade ago was probably 
unforeseen, i.e., the number of notifications received by big ISPs. The few of 
them that have a transparency policy report as the most recent figures around 
four million notifications per week.92 The reliance on the private sector ability 
to protect fundamental rights, in light of the costs that a careful procedure of 
analysis of notification requires, is an aspect that needs a profound assessment.  
Another central aspect of ISP liability involves a general monitoring 
obligation on ISPs. Under EU law, general monitoring obligations are generally 
prohibited, as clearly established by Article 15 of the ECD: “Member States 
shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services 
covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they 
transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances 
indicating illegal activity.”93 General monitoring obligations have been defined 
as requiring “active observation of all electronic communications conducted on 
the network of [an intermediary] and, consequently, would encompass all 
information to be transmitted and all customers using that network.”94 This is 
usually done by employing extremely intrusive technologies such as DPI. As 
seen in the first part of this Paper, such tools—in order to identify the illegal 
content—have the ability to access all parts of all the packets (the smallest units 
of information transmitted on the Internet) that are sent during an online 
communication.95 
This would allow intermediaries to actually intercept and read everything 
sent over a specific network. As in many other fields of law, the protection of 
some rights (those threatened by illegal content such as defamatory 
publications, counterfeited wares, privacy violations, etc.) can cause harm to 
other rights (those of the parties that conduct legitimate activities: Internet 
subscribers’ freedom of expression and protection of personal data, 
intermediaries’ freedom of economic initiative, right-holders’ IP rights, etc.). 
                                                                                                                       
 91 Id. 
 92 See, e.g., Transparency Report: Requests To Remove Content, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright (last visited Sept. 10, 2013). 
 93 See Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 35, at 13. 
 94 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et 
Éditeurs S.C.R.L. (SABAM), http://curia.europa.eu ¶ 39 (Nov. 24, 2011). 
 95 See Margoni & Perry, supra note 5, at 20. 
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The fundamental rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (EU Charter), together with the human rights contained in the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), are all of equal weight, and none is 
deemed superior to any other.96 
In Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España 
SAU, the European Court of Justice made clear that the protection of the 
fundamental right to property, which includes the rights conferred by 
intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of other 
fundamental rights.97 Among such rights, specific attention has been paid to 
individuals’ rights to protection of personal data and their freedom to receive or 
impart information, and ISPs’ rights to conduct business (rights safeguarded by 
Articles 8, 11, and 16 of the EU Charter, respectively).98 The European Court of 
Justice has called for “an interpretation of the directives which allows a fair 
balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the 
Community legal order,” an interpretation which would further respect other 
fundamental rights and “the other general principles of Community law, such as 
the principle of proportionality.”99 The principle of proportionality in particular 
is a fundamental principle that permeates the EU legal order. It is recognized at 
the highest level at Article 5 of the Treaty on the EU, and it has been repeatedly 
analyzed (even outside the specific area of law we are proposing to study here) 
by European Court of Justice case law and the literature.100 
The DMCA has no clear provision prohibiting general monitoring 
obligations.101 However, in a 2010 decision, a United States district court found 
that under the DMCA, no general obligations to filter content exist for the 
intermediary, and the obligation to identify infringing content lies on the right-
holder.102 This decision was overturned in part and remanded to the district 
                                                                                                                       
 96 See Scarlet, Case C-70/10 ¶ 43. 
 97 Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de 
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court, which ruled consistently with its first decision.103 The case is currently on 
appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The limitations on the liability of ISPs possess common traits across the 
countries herein surveyed. Such similarities can be traced back to the general 
principle set forth in the Agreed Statements on Article 8 of WCT regarding acts 
of direct infringement of the right of communication to the public, and—on a 
much more detailed level—to national (and EU) legislative interventions. The 
DMCA and the ECD represent the most advanced examples of such legislation, 
with countries such as Canada and Australia following a similar direction, 
although through different approaches. Canada in particular might represent an 
interesting approach by offering a different balance to the interests involved, 
one that allegedly offers higher protection for freedom to communicate and 
users’ rights over acts of alleged copyright infringement. The future application 
of such a provision should be followed with close attention. 
It must be borne in mind that the choice of where to allocate liability for 
users’ infringements is a public policy choice. To burden ISPs with a duty to 
actively control every aspect of information flow across their part of the 
network and to monitor every server might very well support the interests of the 
right-holders. However, such a scheme would hardly lower the number of 
infringements, and would only provide a much more solvent co-tortfeasor that 
right-holders can target with their damage claims. If, by using sophisticated 
monitoring, the service providers gain knowledge of the infringing content, then 
they become a suitable target—they have relatively deep pockets and are easy 
to identify. Furthermore, legal actions for tens of millions of dollars brought 
against a public company are much better accepted by society and the market 
than those brought against individuals.  
However, to allocate such responsibility completely to ISPs— beyond the 
compromise currently in place—would create an obstacle to ISPs’ operations, 
and likely deter investment in the Internet infrastructure and the evolving 
network ecosystem. It must be pointed out that Internet related activities 
account for 21% of GDP growth and for 25% of job creation in at least the G8 
economies.104 Indeed, from this point of view, to allocate liability to ISPs could 
be seen as holding shareholders of limited liability companies liable for the 
company debts beyond the face value of their shares. The legal limitation of 
investors’ liability to their company’s debts matured, not accidentally, during 
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the Industrial Revolution. If investors were to be considered liable beyond the 
face value of their shares, they probably would not embark on the most 
dangerous and risky enterprises—those that lead to the creation of innovative 
industries, new trade routes, and novel products.  
From a policy perspective, development and innovation were favored over 
those business models that had reached maturity. It was a choice based on 
efficiency principles. Its intrinsic fairness can be disputed. From the perspective 
of creditors who see their credit paid only up to a small percentage, if at all, 
when the companies fail it is clearly an unfair solution, since they are held liable 
for the risk-taking activities (but not of the related revenues) undertaken by the 
company. Nonetheless, nation states have decided to allocate risks and costs in 
this specific way to favor and incentivize innovation and investment over rent-
seekers, because at the end of the day, the global welfare would be greater for 
the entire society (although distributed quite differently from the previous status 
quo). The very same reasoning can be applied to ISPs’ liability. To burden them 
with liability for users’ acts would stifle Internet-based innovation and frustrate 
further investment in such market sector. 
There is a second strong argument against the allocation of more liability to 
ISPs. This second argument is based not on a law and economic perspective, but 
on a fundamental rights one. As we have seen in our study, the technologies that 
ISPs already use, and would employ to a much greater extent if they were 
forced to make sure that nothing illegal is transmitted over their communication 
channels, is intrusive and potentially threatening to fundamental rights. A 
general surveillance tool based on DPI being used by the communications 
industry is not acceptable nor even desired by most ISPs. As identified by the 
European Court of Justice, although such tools make it possible to read all 
communications transmitted over the network, it comes at the price of a clear 
and obvious weakening of fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, 
freedom to conduct a business, privacy and confidentiality of communications, 
and property and intellectual property.  
The sense of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations resides 
precisely in this: by maintaining that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor their 
communications channels, and thus making them not strictly liable for omitting 
to engage in such control, legislators have been attempting to remove those 
legal and economic mechanisms that otherwise would justify such intrusive 
control of their networks. On the other hand, ISPs which decide to employ such 
tools, for example to throttle peer-to-peer file sharing, should be careful since 
control of and the ability to modify content could be the gateway to liability. 
 
